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Nicholas Shea’s excellent book Representation in Cognitive Science is the 
most recent attempt to provide a naturalized theory of representational 
content, that is, an attempt to explain how representations, understood 
as content-baring physical particulars, acquire their content, using non-
semantic, nonmental and non-normative descriptions (11). The account 
offered in his book is a continuation of the two most infl uential naturalis-
tic approaches to mental content—teleosemantic approach (Millikan, Pap-
ineau) and informational approach (Dretske, Neander). His account relies 
on standard resources of these theories—most important of those being 
the notions of function, information and correspondence, but develops an 
original understanding of how these notions converge in the metaphysical 
determination of representational content. In doing so it also relies on the 
work by Peter Godfrey-Smith. Shea’s book is abundant with case studies 
ranging from studies of simple artifi cial and animal systems to those more 
complex but suffi ciently understood by cognitive neuroscience, such as the 
spatial-navigation system in the rat’s hippocampus. He uses them to de-
velop his account, but also to test it in relation to standard objections made 
against teleosemantic approaches, such as the problem of indeterminacy of 
function or the infamous swampman objection.
The book is divided in three parts. The fi rst one is introductory and of-
fers a framework for the account developed in the rest of the book (chapters 
1, 2). Part two presents his account of representational content, centering 
on its three main ingredients—task function, correlational information and 
structural correspondence (chapters 3, 4, 5). Part three answers aforemen-
tioned indeterminacy and swampman objections, offers an account of the 
distinction between descriptive and directive representation and concludes 
with several considerations concerning the explanatory role of content and 
content of higher personal, conscious states (chapters 6, 7, 8). Lack of space 
makes it impossible to present every chapter separately. It also makes it 
impossible to present the numerous case studies and important subdiscus-
sions which comprise Shea’s book. While admitting its insuffi ciency, the 
review will be focused on presenting several key aspects of Shea’s book.
The ingenuity of Shea’s account consists in its ability to reconcile re-
sources of different, competing theories of mental content. The main idea 
behind his theory of representational content is that content arises out of 
the convergence of three elements—functions, in his account called task 
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functions, exploitable relations and internal mechanism—each of which is 
necessary for content. The core idea is that representational vehicles ac-
quire content by bearing certain relations to the environment, relations 
that are exploited by an internal mechanism in order to perform a certain 
function. What is immediately noticable from this, somewhat crude, defi ni-
tion is that on Shea’s account, content is partially determined by the rela-
tional properties of vehicles, that is, externalist. This is justifi ed by the fact 
that behaviour, as an explanandum, involves responding to distal environ-
mental features in order to bring distal environmental effects. Secondly, 
Shea’s account is committed to there being real vehicles of representation. 
His account is thus a version of a representational theory of mind. However, 
he intends his theory of content to apply fi rst and most to subpersonal, 
unconscious representations, since these fi gure prominently in cognitive 
science and cognitive neuroscience. Considerations about fi rst-person, con-
scious mental states are given in the fi nal chapter of the book. Finally, there 
is no reliance on the notion of a representational consumer characteristic of 
teleosemantics, since Shea fi nds it problematic to apply a consumer-based 
analysis on complex, “multi-layered” and feedback-involving systems. Even 
though his account shares with teleosemantics the view that the content of 
representations is determined by their use, it is their use in downstream 
processing by an internal mechanism that determines content, not their 
being used by a dedicated consumer system.
One important point of departure between Shea’s account and its prede-
cessors is his pluralistic framework, which he calls varitel semantics. Con-
tent, according to Shea, can be determined by more than one suffi cient con-
dition. The source of this pluralism is a disjunctive account of functions and 
exploitable relations, which makes content determination different depend-
ing on the type of function and exploitable relation present in each case.
The proper way to explain functions (in his account task functions) pos-
sessed by an organism, according to Shea, is by giving a consequence etiol-
ogy. This is a point which Shea shares with other teleosemantic approaches. 
Dispositions for behavioral outcomes produced by an organism are ex-
plained by the fact that the same behavioral outcomes produced certain 
distal effects which were benefi cial for the organism in the past. Because of 
their benefi cial consequences, the production of these distal effect became 
a stabilized function of the behavioral outcome produced by an organism. 
However, while teleosemantics admits of natural selection as the only pro-
cess that stabilizes functions (learning being a derivative of natural selec-
tion), Shea allows for three more types of stabilizing processes. In living 
organisms, these are learning with feedback and persistence of organisms 
(contribution to survival of an individual organism); while in artifi cial sys-
tems this process is deliberate design. On Shea’s account each of these four 
types of stabilizing processes tend to converge with another property which 
Shea fi nds important in describing function, and that is robustness. Sta-
bilizing processes tend to stabilize those behavioural outcomes which are 
suffi ciently robust, that is, which can perform their function in a range of 
different conditions. One way for an organism to possess this feature is for 
its internal mechanisms to be sensitive to a wide range of different inputs. 
Representational explanation offers a solution of how organisms manage 
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to achieve this robustness. By having vehicles that bear relations to vary-
ing environmental features, an internal mechanism is able to exploit these 
relations in order to successfully perform a function in different conditions.
This brings us to the second part of Shea’s theory—exploitable relations. 
Remember the central idea that a system performs its task function by hav-
ing an internal mechanism whose processing is able to exploit the relations 
its vehicles bear to distal features of environment. These exploitable rela-
tions can be of two types. The fi rst type of relation is correlational informa-
tion (Chapter 4). Correlational information is usually conceived as a relation 
of probability raising. Obtaining of a certain state A raises the probability 
that another state B is also obtaining. However, a certain state usually cor-
relates with a number of different states (and properties) and correlates so 
in varying strengths. The appropriate way to identify the correlation that is 
actually exploited by an internal mechanism, Shea believes, is to see which 
correlations have an unmediated role in explaining how a system performs 
its function. In turn, to explain how a system performs a function is to ex-
plain how that function became stabilized and robustly produced. Focusing 
on the explanatory role of exploitable relations ties content-determination 
tightly with explanatory considerations (a fact which does not imply a de-
pendence on an intentional observer). To use a famous example, in explain-
ing how a frog is able to catch a fl y, we can identify different correlations 
which exist between the frog’s retinal ganglion cells and the properties at-
tributable to fl y and thus a number of candidates for content-determination. 
The cells correlate with there being a little black thing, a fl y, a nutritious 
object, a fl y I saw two minutes ago etc. This is one aspect of the notorious 
problem of indeterminacy of content. However, Shea argues, a correlation 
with little black thing explains why the frog is able to perform its function 
of catching a fl y only in a mediated way, that is, by also correlating with 
nutritious object or fl y and nutritious object or fl y is what unmediatedly ex-
plains why the function of catching fl ies came to be stabilized and robustly 
produced. If little black thing had not correlated with nutritious object or fl y, 
an explanation of how the function of catching fl ies came to be (historically) 
stabilized by the frog would miss out on an important explanatory pattern. 
Let us now turn to the second type of exploitable relation that fi gures in 
Shea’s varitel semantics—structural correspondence (Chapter 5).
Shea defi nes structural correspondence in the following way: a struc-
tural correspondence exists between a relation V on vehicles vm and a rela-
tion H on entities xn iff there is a function f which maps the vm onto the xn 
and ∀i,j V(vi,vj) ↔ H(f(vi),f(vj)) (117). It is a well-known point that structural 
correspondence is too liberal for fi xing content. This is because a certain re-
lation V on vm can correspond to many different relations H1....Hn on worldly 
entities xn, given that vm and xn are of the same cardinality. Shea proposes 
to constrain this liberality by requiring that the correspondence is actu-
ally exploited by a system in order to perform a function. This involves a 
double restriction on the candidates for content-constituting structural cor-
respondences. First, the mechanism performing a certain function has to 
be sensitive to the relation which exists on the vehicles (the relation has to 
be used in downstream processing) and the correspondence has to play an 
unmediated role in explaining how a system performs a function (it has to 
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be of signifi cance to the system). This way the notion of structural corre-
spondence becomes suffi ciently constrained and also tractable by empirical 
investigations. In chapter 5 Shea gives a number of wonderful demonstra-
tions of how his account can be applied to cases of representing spatial rela-
tions, similarity and causal structure.
Next, in chapter 7 Shea offers an account of the distinction between 
directive an descriptive content based on his varitel framework and gives a 
comparison with existing accounts (Millikan, Price, Artiga, Sterelny etc.) At 
fi rst approximation, directive content is concerned with producing a certain 
condition, while descriptive content is concerned with refl ecting a certain 
condition. Shea draws the distinction by relying on the resources of his vari-
tel semantics. A vehicle R standing in an exploitable relation (correlational 
information or structural correspondence) with a condition C has directive 
content if the production of C by a vehicle R plays an unmediated role in 
explaining how a system performs a task function. On the other hand, a 
vehicle R standing in an exploitable relation with a condition C has descrip-
tive content if C’s obtaining when R is tokened plays an unmediated role in 
explaining the system’s performance of a function, but not via R’s producing 
C (pp. 180–181). Shea then demonstrates how his way of drawing the dis-
tinction applies to different cases presented in his book.
A fi nal aspect we will examine is the application of Shea’s account to the 
problems of indeterminacy of content (the problems of distality, specifi city 
and disjunction) which is presented in Chapter 6. In presenting his solution, 
Shea makes several comparisons between his and other solutions present in 
the literature. He aligns his theory with the so-called “high church” teleose-
mantics which ties content to explanations of successful behaviour prompt-
ed by a representation, as opposed to “low church” teleosemantics which ties 
content with discriminative abilities of the organism. This is so because on 
Shea’s account the determinacy of content is grounded in the determinacy 
of task functions and the exploitable relations which play a role in explain-
ing these functions. Since explanations of stabilization and robustness of 
task functions are causal explanations they make a restriction on the type 
of properties that are adequate in explaining task functions, on both the 
explanandum and the explanans side. This makes the proper identifi cation 
of the task function involve properties which actually led to stabilization 
and robustness. Returning to the frog example, this means that the cor-
rect description of its task function is catching fl ies and not, for example, 
catching little black things. On the side of the explanandum, similarly, the 
adequate properties will again be those that fi gure in a causal explana-
tion of stabilization and robustness. On Shea’s account those will include, of 
course, the exploitable relations of correlational information and structural 
correspondence. Given Shea’s requirement that these relations have to be 
those relations that unmediately explain stabilization and robustness, they 
will turn out to be properties such as fl y or nutritious object rather than 
little black thing or my favourite fl y. It is noticeable that this still leaves a 
certain degree of indeterminacy of content. However, Shea argues that this 
consequence is due to the nature of simple systems such as the frog. Even 
in the simple cases, Shea argues, determinacy of task functions and exploit-
able relations provides a considerable degree of determinacy on content.
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It is safe to conclude that Shea’s Representation in Cognitive Science will 
become an essential reading in the literature concerning mental represen-
tation. Apart from offering an ingenious account of representational con-
tent, the book provides a clear identifi cation of the standard problems which 
surround theorizing about representational content. It also makes numer-
ous comparisons to existing accounts and provides discussions about other 
themes, such as the notion of biological function or explanation. In spite of 
its complexity and extensive use of results from cognitive science and neuro-
science, which demand a more specialized reader, these facts make the book 
suffi ciently accessible to graduate level students and other, less informed, 
scientifi c and philosophical audiences that are interested in exploring the 
nature of mental representation.
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